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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to examine whether an optimal investment level exists in hotel firms. The
authors examined the quadratic relation between investments and hotel firm value. The results
show that there is an optimal investment level that maximizes firm value. However, the optimal
investment level varies across firms on the basis of the quality of investment opportunities or
under- and overinvestment problems. The optimal investment level is higher for hotel firms with
underinvestment problems, which suggests that these firms have valuable investment opportu-
nities. However, the optimal investment level is lower for hotel firms with overinvestment
problems, which implies that shareholders of these firms perceive additional investments to be
value destroying. These results support the postulations of the Q theory of investment, pecking
order theory, and free cash flow theory. Practical implications are discussed in the realm of
financing, investment, and dividend policies.
Introduction
The main objective of the firm is to maximize
shareholders’ wealth or to maximize value and
the value is maximized when the optimal invest-
ment level (OPT) is reached. The irrelevance theo-
rem developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958)
suggests that firms will make investments to max-
imize their value and investments are not related
to firms’ the capital structures. Put differently,
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that firms
can finance their investments through internal
capital, debt, equity, or through a combination of
these financing instruments and that the financing
decision will not affect profitability of investments.
Although the irrelevance theorem postulates that a
firm’s investment decisions are independent from
financing decisions, the results from the empirical
finance literature showed substantial evidence that
financing and investment decisions are not sepa-
rate. There is asymmetric information that exists
in the capital markets and hence firms’ investment
can deviate from the optimal level because of
under- or overinvestment problems (Stein, 2003).
An investment below the optimum investment
level is considered an underinvestment, whereas
an investment beyond the optimum investment
level is considered an overinvestment. Both
under- and overinvestment is problematic for the
firm because these investment levels are beyond
the maximum firm value.
On the one hand, underinvestment problems
occur when there is a substantial difference
between the cost of internal and external funds
that turns a positive net present value (NPV)
investment negative. Myers and Majluf (1984)
posit that firms will bypass an investment that
requires financing beyond the available internal
funds because issuing debt or equity to finance
the investment will make the investment unprofi-
table. Firms will mainly be dependent on internal
funds to make investments and hence they will
operate in a suboptimal investment level, which
leaves firms below the maximum firm value
(Hadlock & Pierce, 2010). Hotel firms’ invest-
ments, such as mergers and acquisitions and
development and building of hotel properties
require substantial capital spending (Lee &
Upneja, 2007; Dogru & Sirakaya-Turk, 2016).
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However, a hotel firm may not be able to finance
all of its value-increasing projects with available
internal funds and face underinvestment
problems.
On the other hand, overinvestment problems
occur when there is a misalignment of interests
between firms’ managers and shareholders. Jensen
(1986) proposed the free cash flow theory, postu-
lating that managers of firms are likely to use
internal funds to make investments that increase
their compensations even if the investment is not
profitable. Managers will rely on internal funds to
undertake investments that mainly benefit them
because capital market will not finance unprofita-
ble investments. Hence, these firms will operate
beyond the OPT, which decreases firm value
(Harford, Humphery-Jenner, & Powell, 2012).
However, managers of hotel firms may finance
value-decreasing projects with available internal
funds and creates overinvestment problems.
A large hospitality finance literature examined
the relation between hotel investments and firm
value to analyze the extent to which investments
create value for hotel firms. Canina (2001) showed
that acquisitions increases hotel firm value; how-
ever, Hsu and Jang (2007) found acquisitions to be
value-decreasing investments. Dalbor, Lee, and
Upneja (2007), on the other hand, showed that
the relation between investment and firm value
was not significant. Subsequent studies have used
similar methods that were used in previous studies
and have reported mixed evidence (Canina, Kim,
& Ma, 2010; Dogru, 2017). Therefore, it is not
clear why investments create value in some hotels
and deteriorate firm value in others.
Furthermore, existing studies assumed a mono-
tonic relation between investments and firm value;
however, there is no theoretical reason to expect a
monotonic relation between investment and firm
value. On the contrary, Q theory of investment,
pecking order theory, and free cash flow theory
jointly suggest that the relation between invest-
ment and firm value is nonmonotonic (Jensen,
1986; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Tobin, 1969). That
is, there is an OPT, where firm value is maximized.
The optimal investment can be different for each
firm. Firms’ growth prospects, the quality of
investments, and alignment of interests between
managers and shareholders determines the OPT.
Investments will increase firm value until the OPT
is reached, and investments beyond the optimal
level will decrease firm value. Therefore, the rela-
tion between investment and firm value is para-
bolic rather than monotonic (Morgado & Pindado,
2003). However, previous studies have not tested
these postulations to examine whether an OPT
exists in hotel firms.
This study therefore aims to examine whether
there is an OPT in hotel firms. We examine the
quadratic relation between investments and hotel
firm value. Investigating the relation between hotel
firm investment and value can help to determine
why investments create value in some hotel firms
and destroy value in others. If an OPT exists that
maximizes firm value, firms can better devise
investment, financing, and dividend policy deci-
sions on the basis of their OPTs.
Current and prospective shareholders can make
buy-sell-hold decisions on the basis of the firms’
OPT and post hoc investment, financing, and divi-
dend policies.
Theoretical framework
According to the irrelevance theorem developed by
Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms’ investment deci-
sion is irrelevant to financing decision, suggesting that
the costs of internal and external capital do not
diverge. Thus, firms can finance their investments
through internal capital, debt, equity, or through a
combination of these financing instruments and that
the financing decision will not affect return on firms’
investments. Building on the irrelevance theorem,
Jorgenson (1963) developed the neoclassical theory
of investment, postulating that there might be a cost
of capital and this cost might be different under
different capital structures. Nevertheless, additional
investments will increase firm value as long as the
return on investment is higher than the cost of capital.
According to this notion, firms’ investment decisions
depend on the cost of capital, suggesting that firm will
continue to make investments as long as the invest-
ment has a positive NPV.
While Jorgenson (1963) argued that firms
would make additional investment as long as the
return on investment is positive, counterargu-
ments have been developed against this proposi-
tion. Q theory of investment postulates that a firm
18 T. DOGRU AND E. SIRAKAYA-TURK
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reaches an equilibrium when the Tobin’s Q equals
to one or industry average; a point in which OPT
is reached and firm value is maximized (Tobin,
1969). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of
the firm to replacement cost of the firm’s assets. A
Tobin’s Q higher than 1 or the industry average
suggests that firms have great investment oppor-
tunities and growth prospects, whereas a Tobin’s
Q lower than 1 or the industry average indicates
that firm does not have profitable investment pro-
jects or potential to generate excess cash flows
from the existing projects. Therefore, firms will
continue to make investments when the Tobin’s
Q is higher than 1 or the industry average to reach
the equilibrium, and firms will not make addi-
tional investments when the equilibrium is
reached. Q theory of investment suggests that the
relation between investments and firm value
depends on the firms’ Tobin’s Q ratios.
Furthermore, pecking order theory suggests that
that there is asymmetric information that exists
between a firm and outside investors and lenders,
which makes the external financing more costly
than internal financing (Myers, 1977; Myers &
Majluf, 1984). Asymmetric information problem
creates a deviation between the costs of internal
and external funds and for some firms the devia-
tion can be so high that it can turn a positive NPV
project into negative.
That is, a project will have a positive NPV when
the project is financed with internal funds and cost
of internal funds is used as a discount rate; how-
ever, the same project will have a negative NPV
when external funds are required to finance the
project and hence cost of external funds is used as
a discount rate. Firms that encounter asymmetric
information problem will forego potentially value-
increasing projects and operate in a suboptimal
investment level, which creates underinvestment
problems. In general, these firms are small and
young and have unexploited growth opportunities
(Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & Poterba,
1988). These firms will not waste their limited
resources on value-decreasing projects because
they are highly dependent on their limited internal
funds to make investments (Denis & Sibilkov,
2009; Dogru, 2017). Therefore, investments are
expected to increase firm value and move these
firms toward the OPT.
Although the Q theory of investment suggested
that firms would not make additional investment
when the equilibrium is reached, free cash flow
theory proposed by Jensen (1986) argued that
there is a conflict of interests between managers
and shareholders. Misaligned managers are likely
to invest the generated free cash flow in projects to
increase their compensation and control over the
firm, even if an investment has a negative NPV.
These firms operate above the OPT, which creates
overinvestment problems. In general, these firms
are large and mature, with limited growth oppor-
tunities. These firms are also highly dependent on
internal funds. However, managers of such firms
are likely to waste firms’ internal funds to make
investments that will increase their personal bene-
fits. Therefore, investments are expected to
decrease firm value and move these firms away
from the OPT.
Previous empirical finance literature has shown
evidence supporting under- and overinvestment
theory propositions using Tobin’s Q to identify
firms with under- and overinvestment problems.
Vogt (1997), for example, showed that capital
expenditures create value in firms with a Tobin’s
Q higher than 1 and decrease value in firms with a
Tobin’s Q lower than 1. Earlier studies, however,
assumed that the relation between investment is
firm value is monotonic and analyzed the relation
between investment and firm value by dividing the
firms as under- and overinvestment firms.
However, there is no theoretical reason to assume
a monotonic relation between investment and firm
value. Investigating the relation between invest-
ment and firm value in Spanish Stock Market,
Morgado and Pindado (2003) found a quadratic
relation between investment and firm value, which
suggests that there is an optimal investment value
that maximizes shareholders’ wealth. In summary,
Q theory of investment, pecking order theory, and
free cash flow theory suggest that the relation
between investment and firm value is not mono-
tonic but rather quadratic. Figure 1 illustrates the
quadratic relation between investment and firm
value.
Firms will continue to make investment until
the optimum investment level is reached. At this
point, the marginal cost of capital is equal to
marginal value of investment and hence firm
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 19
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value is maximized. However, firms’ investment
can deviate from the optimal as a result of asym-
metric information that exists in capital markets or
agency problems that creates a conflict of interests
between shareholders and the manager. On the
one hand, firms may not undertake a positive
NPV project when they do not have sufficient
internal funds because raising external funds
increases the project’s cost, which leave firms
below the OPT and maximum firm value (under-
investment). On the other hand, managers of
firms, who seek personal benefits, might invest in
projects beyond the level that maximizes firm
value using firms’ internal resources, which move
firms above the OPT and shifts firm value beyond
the maximization (overinvestment). Therefore,
based on the postulations of Q theory of invest-
ment, pecking order theory, and free cash flow
theory, the following hypothesis is developed.
Hypothesis 1: There is an OPT in hotel firms, where
firm value is maximized.
The OPT, however, will be different for hotel
firms depending on the quality of their invest-
ments. On the one hand, the OPT will be higher
for firms with underinvestment problems (firms
with Tobin’s Q higher than one or industry aver-
age) because these firms have limited funds but
greater investment opportunities. On the other
hand, the OPT will be lower for firms with over-
investment problems (firms with Tobin’s Q lower
than one or industry average) because these firms
have excess funds but limited growth opportu-
nities. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004)
found empirical evidence showing that firms with
underinvestment problems retain more cash to
undertake positive NPV projects. Denis and
Sibilkov (2009) show that the marginal value of
cash holdings is higher in firms with underinvest-
ment problems, which suggests that these firms
keep higher cash to make value-increasing invest-
ments. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) showed
that investments decreases value in firms with
overinvestment problems. Studies of Masulis,
Wang, and Xie (2007) and Harford and colleagues
(2012) also showed that managers of firms with
excess cash flows invest in value-decreasing pro-
jects. Analyzing the joint effects of under- and
overinvestment problems on the relation between
investment and firm value, Franzoni (2009) found
that investments increase firm value in firms with
underinvestment problems whereas decrease firm
value in firms with overinvestment problems.
Thus, the following hypotheses are offered for
testing purposes.
Hypothesis 2: The OPT for firms with underinvest-
ment problems will be higher than the average OPT
for hotel firms.
Hypothesis 3: The OPT for firms with overinvest-
ment problems will be lower than the average OPT
for hotel firms.
Figure 2 presents the projected relation between
investment and firm value for firms with under-
and overinvestment problems. Accordingly, the
proposed hypotheses jointly suggest that there
will be three different OPTs with the following
order. OPT-over<OPT-all<OPT-under.
Firm Value
Optimum Investment-
Maximum Value
Overinvestment
Underinvestment
Investment
Figure 1. Quadratic relation between investment and firm value.
Firm Value
Investment
Underinvestment Firm
Average Firm
Overinvestment Firm
Figure 2. Investment and firm value: Underinvestment versus
overinvestment.
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● An OPT in hotel firms with overinvestment
problems (or Tobin’s Q below one or indus-
try average): OPT-over;
● An OPT in hotel firms (including both firms
with under- and overinvestment problems):
OPT-all; and
● An OPT in hotel firms with underinvestment
problems (or Tobin’s Q higher than one or
industry average): OPT-under.
Method
The sample of this study comprises the hotel firms
that are publicly traded in the New York Stock
Exchange, American Exchange, or NASDAQ with
the SIC code 7011 during the period of 1995–2015.
The sample was limited to firms with financial
information available on the COMPUSTAT annual
database. The final sample consists of 280 firm-year
observations.
Based on the hospitality finance and mainstream
corporate finance literature, the following variables
are used in this study (Dalbor et al., 2007; Lee &
Upneja, 2007; Morgado & Pindado, 2003; Vogt,
1997). Investment ismeasured by capital expenditures
(item 128), firm value is measured by capital stocks
outstanding (item 54) times the fiscal year closing
price for stock i on year t (item 199), long term debt
is measured by total long term debt (item 9), divi-
dends is measured by total dividends (item 21).
Following the previous literature, we used Tobin’s
Q, as measured by total assets plus firm’s market
value minus common equity (item 60), balance sheet
deferred taxes (item 74) and leverage divided by total
assets, to divide the firms as firms with underinvest-
ment problems and overinvestment problems
(Morgado & Pindado, 2003; Vogt, 1997). Firms with
Tobin’s Q values greater than the median values are
firms with underinvestment problems, whereas firms
below the median Tobin’s Q values are firms with
overinvestment problems.We used Tobin’s Qmedian
values to divide the sample of firms as firms with
under- and overinvestment problems because most
of the hotel firms had a Tobin’s Q value higher than
one in our sample. More specifically, 260 out of 280
observations had Tobin’s Q higher than one. Also,
Hua, Nusair, and Upneja (2012) showed that industry
median values should be used for benchmarking
firms’ financial performances. Items are
COMPUSTAT items, and all variables are adjusted
by total asset (item 6). Variables are trimmed from 1%
and 99% to remove the effects of outliers.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
variables used in this study along with the correla-
tion matrix of these variables. The results show that
there is a positive and statistically significant rela-
tion between firm value and investment, firm value
and debt, firm value and dividends, and firm value
and Tobin’s Q. These results suggest that firm value
increases with the increased investments, debt, pay-
ment of dividends, and Tobin’s Q ratio. However,
further analyses are required to examine the effects
of these variables on firm value.
The following models are used to examine the
relation between investment and firm value.
FVit ¼ a0 þ β1Iit þ
X
n
k¼1βkXkt þ eit (1)
FVit ¼ a0 þ β2Iit þ β3I2it þ
X
n
k¼1βmXmt þ eit (2)
where I is the firm i’s capital expenditure at time t; X
is a set of control variables including long-term debt
and dividends at time t; e is the error term; and α, β!,
β!, β!, β!, and β! are the models’ parameters. Also,
models are controlled for time and firm effects.
Taking the derivative of the parameters from the
equation 2, the OPT will be equal to:
OPT ¼ δFVit
δIit
¼ β2
2β3
(3)
Empirical results
Multivariate analyses are conducted using panel
ordinary least square (OLS) techniques, panel
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics Correlation matrix
Variable M SD Median 1 2 3 4 5
1. Firm value 1.29 3.00 0.58 1
2. Investment 0.13 0.45 0.05 0.38a 1
3. Debt 0.53 1.00 0.39 0.69a 0.32a 1
4. Dividends 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.11c –0.04 0.07 1
5. Tobin’s Q 2.51 3.53 1.63 0.94a 0.57a 0.65a 0.08 1
Superscript a and c indicate 1% and 10% statistical significance levels,
respectively.
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fixed and random effects. While panel OLS tech-
nique is widely used in the mainstream corporate
finance literature by controlling for year-fixed
effect (i.e., including year dummy variables),
whereas panel fixed and random effects are uti-
lized in hospitality literature.
Therefore, we conduct our analyses using three
different methods.
We first analyzed the linear relation between invest-
ment and firm value. Table 2 presents these results.
The results from the panel OLS, fixed effect, and
random effect models yield similar coefficients
estimates. Therefore, the interpretation will be
based on panel OLS results. Accordingly, there is
a positive and significant relation between invest-
ment and firm value controlling for debt and divi-
dends (1.28, p < .01). More specifically, a $1
increase in investment increases firm value by
$1.28. Although the empirical results show a sta-
tistically significant relation between investment
and firm value, there is no theoretical reason to
expect a monotonic relation between investment
and firm value. That is, this relation can simply be
spurious. If a monotonic (or linear) relation were
assumed, we would expect every additional invest-
ment to increase firm value, which suggests a
linear relation between investment and firm value
as presented in Figure 3.
Although this notion might be held to the
extent the OPT is reached, an investment beyond
this point will decrease firm value. Therefore, we
further examine whether an OPT exists in hotel
firms by introducing the quadratic term into the
empirical model. Table 3 presents the results from
the quadratic relation between investment and
firm value.
The results from the panel OLS, fixed effect, and
random effect models yield similar coefficients esti-
mates. Therefore, the interpretation will be based on
panel OLS results. The statistically significant posi-
tive coefficient estimate of investment (5.68, p < .01)
and negative coefficient estimate of investment
squared (–0.74, p < .01) variables provide empirical
evidence that there exists an OPT in hotel firms.
These results support the first hypothesis of this
study. Using the equation (3), the OPT can be deter-
mined. Accordingly, the OPT for hotel firms is
approximately $3.83 million adjusted by firm size
or book value of assets. In theory, this figure indi-
cates that firms will continue to make investments
until they reach this point and should not make
additional investments once this point is reached
because investments beyond this point will decrease
firm value. However, the OPT can be different across
Table 2 Linear Relation Between Firm Value and Investment
Independent
variable
Panel ordinary
least square
Panel fixed
effect
Panel
random
effect
Investment 1.28a (3.44) 1.28a (3.44) 0.96a (3.27)
Debt 2.02a (14.99) 2.02a (14.99) 1.99 (15.69)
Dividends 9.56 (1.92) 9.56 (1.92) 6.53 (1.49)
Constant 0.57 (0.60) 0.58 (0.98) 0.04 (0.18)
R2 0.73
Adjusted R2 0.65
Overall R2 054 0.55
F 9.19a 16.15a
Wald test of joint
significance
390.54a
Note. Thre were a total of 280 observations. Firm value is the depen-
dent variable; t and z statistics are in parentheses.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical signifi-
cance levels, respectively.
Firm Value
Investment
Figure 3. Linear relation between firm value and investment.
Table 3 Quadratic Relation Between Firm Value and Investment
Independent
variable
Panel ordinary
least square
Panel fixed
effect
Panel random
effect
Investment 5.68a (6.78) 6.04 (6.44) 5.79a (7.02)
Investment
squared
–0.74a (–5.93) –0.75a (–5.47) –0.76a (–6.22)
Debt 2.10a (15.65) 2.17a (16.77) 2.17a (17.66)
Dividends 8.92b (2.14) 11.80b (2.51) 9.20b (2.23)
Constant –0.44 (–0.81) –0.96 (–1.53) –0.56 (–1.09)
R2 0.60
Adjusted R2 0.57
Overall R2 0.59 0.60
F 17.22a 18.84a
Wald test of joint
significance
480.60a
Note. Thre were a total of 280 observations. Firm value is the depen-
dent variable; t and z statistics are in parentheses.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical signifi-
cance levels, respectively.
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firms depending on their quality of investment
opportunities. Firms with greater investment oppor-
tunities are expected to have a higher OPT, whereas
firms with low investment opportunities are antici-
pated to have a lower OPT. To test this intuition, we
divided the firms based on median Tobin’s Q ratios.
Firms with a Tobin’s Q above the median are con-
sidered to be firms with underinvestment problems
but with greater investment opportunities (OPT-
under) and firms with a Tobin’s Q below the median
are considered to be firms with overinvestment pro-
blems with little or not investment opportunities
(OPT-over). The quadratic relation between invest-
ment and firm value is separately analyzed for OPT-
under and OPT-over firm samples. Tables 4 and 5
presents these results.
The results from the panel OLS, fixed effect,
and random effect models in both Tables 4 and 5
yield similar coefficients estimates. Therefore, the
interpretation will be based on Panel OLS results.
The results from Table 4 show that the coefficient
of investment is positive and statistically signifi-
cant (8.65, p < .01) and the coefficient of invest-
ment-square is negative and statistically
significant (–1.11, p < .01).
Similarly, the results from Table 5 also show
that the coefficient of investment is positive and
statistically significant (2.43, p < .05) and the coef-
ficient of investment-square is negative and statis-
tically significant (–8.92, p < .05). Using the
equation (3), the OPT can be determined for
OPT-under and OPT-over firm samples.
Accordingly, the OPT for OPT-under hotel firms
is approximately $3.9 and for OPT-over hotel
firms is approximately $0.13 million adjusted by
firm size or book value of assets. These results
support the second and third hypotheses of this
study, and they provide evidence that the OPT will
be lower for firms with overinvestment problems
than for firms with underinvestment problems:
OPT-over<OPT-all<OPT-under.
Discussion
In a frictionless world (i.e., with no conflict of
interests between different stakeholders), financing
decision of investments does not affect the profit-
ability of investments and firm value; hence, the
source of capital is irrelevant to investment deci-
sions (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).
That is, an investment with a positive NPV will
increase firm value regardless of sources of funds.
However, Q theory of investment suggests that a
firm will continue to make investment until the
OPT is reached and it will not make any further
investment because at this point firm value is
maximized an investment beyond the optimal
level deteriorates firm value (Tobin, 1969).
Moreover, there has been an extensive empirical
research providing evidence that using external
and internal funds to finance investments may
negatively or positively affect firm value depending
on asymmetric information and agency problems.
Table 4 Quadratic Relation Between Firm Value and
Investment: OPT-Under
Independent
variable
Panel ordinary
least square
Panel fixed
effect
Panel random
effect
Investment 8.65a (4.73) 8.65a (4.73) 6.46a (4.82)
Investment
squared
–1.11a (–4.42) –1.11a (–4.42) –0.86a (–4.42)
Debt 2.25a (6.47) 2.25a (6.47) 2.24a (12.09)
Dividends 11.39 (0.78) 11.39 (0.78) 9.40 (1.35)
Constant –0.96 (–0.35) –0.75 (0.67) –0.60 (–0.69)
R2 0.80
Adjusted R2 0.66
Overall R2 0.57 0.62
F 5.71a 6.98a
Wald test of joint
significance
219.53a
Note. Thre were a total of 140 observations. Firm value is the depen-
dent variable; t and z statistics are in parentheses.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical signifi-
cance levels, respectively.
Table 5. Quadratic Relation Between Firm Value and
Investment: OPT-Over
Independent
variable
Panel ordinary
least square
Panel fixed
effect
Panel
random
effect
Investment 2.43b (2.54) 2.43b (2.54) 1.62c (1.85)
Investment
squared
–8.92b (–2.05) –8.92b (–2.05) –5.02 (–1.27)
Debt –0.07 (–1.12) –0.07 (–1.12) –0.08 (–1.30)
Dividends 2.62a (3.05) 2.62a (3.05) 2.14a (2.71)
Constant 0.38a (2.97) 0.22c (1.98) 0.30a (3.07)
R2 0.76
Adjusted R2 0.62
Overall R2 0.11 0.14
F 5.53a 4.31a
Wald test of joint
significance
92.91a
Note. Thre were a total of 140 observations. Firm value is the depen-
dent variable; t and z statistics are in parentheses.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical signifi-
cance levels, respectively.
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On the one hand, proposing the pecking order
theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) postulated that
firms with asymmetric information problem
should rely on internal funds to make investments
because raising external funds will make these
projects unprofitable due the cost differences
between internal and external funds. Myers and
Majluf (1984) argue that firms with asymmetric
information problems will operate in a suboptimal
investment level because they will not have suffi-
cient funds to undertake all valuable projects.
Hence, they will forego value-increasing invest-
ments and encounter underinvestment problems.
On the other hand, free cash flow theory devel-
oped by Jensen (1986) posits that firms with
agency problems should raise debt to finance
their investment and distribute the internal funds
to shareholders because financing a project with
internal funds will make these projects unprofita-
ble. Jensen (1986) argues that firms with agency
problems or managers with excess cash flows will
continuously make investments with the free cash
flows that increase their compensation or power.
Therefore, these firms will operate on level that is
beyond the shareholders’ wealth maximization.
Although there corroborative evidence supporting
both theories and that collectively Q theory of
investment, pecking order theory, and free cash
flows theory suggest that there is an OPT, where
firm value is maximized, the OPT that maximizes
hotel firm value is yet to be determined.
The approach in previous hospitality literature
has been that of a linear relation between invest-
ment and firm value and that the results remain
inconclusive. Whereas some studies have reported
that investments increase firm value, others have
provided contrary evidence. Why investments cre-
ate value in some firms and destroy value in other
firms is not clear.
Therefore, in spite of the well-documented
magnitude of the under- and overinvestment pro-
blems in corporate finance literature, there is still
critical need to examine why investments create or
destroy value. One explanation can be under- and
overinvestment problems, where an OPT exists.
Therefore, the approach in this paper instead was
to analyze the quadratic relation between invest-
ment and firm value to determine whether OPT
exist in hotel firms. The results show that an OPT
exists in hotel firms, where firm value is maxi-
mized. An investment below this level is consid-
ered to be underinvestment, whereas an
investment beyond this level is considered to be
overinvestment. Nevertheless, the OPT is different
across the hotel firms. This is because firms with
underinvestment problems have more valuable
investment projects and hence the expected firm
value is higher. That is, shareholders expectations
of the firm to create value are higher. However,
firms with overinvestment problems have lower
investment opportunities and thus shareholders’
expectation of the value maximization point is
lower. Our results support these postulations by
showing that the OPT is higher for firms with
underinvestment problems compared to the OPT
for firms with overinvestment problems. These
results provide support for the Q theory of invest-
ment, pecking order theory, and free cash flow
theory that there is an OPT, where firm value is
maximized, and the OPT is higher for firms with
underinvestment problems relative to firms with
overinvestment problems.
The practical implications of this study are
noteworthy. Firms should make investments until
the OPT is reached and discontinue their invest-
ments beyond this point because further invest-
ments will decrease firm value. Firms with
overinvestment problems should distribute the
excess cash to the shareholders as dividends or
use the excess cash to repurchase outstanding
shares. These firms should finance their invest-
ments through only debt because banks or cred-
itors will not finance projects with negative NPV.
Nevertheless, firms with overinvestment problems
can use their cash to acquire firms with under-
investment problems because these firms have
value increasing investment opportunities.
Acquisitions are more valuable for firms with
overinvestment than investment projects that are
developed internally to expand the firms’ opera-
tions. Because firms with overinvestment problems
have excess cash but lower investment opportu-
nities, they should acquire firms with underinvest-
ment problems. The firm value after acquisition
will be higher than the individual value of these
firms because of the synergy effect, which will
further increase firms’ stock prices and value.
However, a diversifying acquisition, which extends
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beyond the hotel business, is likely to be a value
decreasing investment. Instituting corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms can help these firms to
further reduce overinvestment problems. Firms
with underinvestment problems have value
increasing investment opportunities but limited
internal funds. Therefore, these firms should keep
more cash to undertake valuable investment
opportunities. When their internal funds are not
sufficient to make investments, they should
expand their operations through acquisitions,
which is paid in stocks. Furthermore, the acquisi-
tion of a company can increase the amount of
internal funds two firms combined and hence
may provide further investment opportunities.
Although asymmetric information still exists,
firms with underinvestment problems should
seek financing through crowdfunding, where indi-
viduals or institutions can determine the true qual-
ity of the investment opportunity and may provide
inexpensive funds.
Despite its contribution to the hospitality and
finance literature, this study has limitations.
Tobin’s Q is a good starting point to determine
firms’ investment opportunities and the quality of
investments opportunities. Nevertheless, Tobin’s
Q per se may not determine the conflict of inter-
ests between shareholders and chief executive offi-
cers, asymmetric information problems that firms
with underinvestment problems are facing in rais-
ing external debts. Future studies should replicate
these study using corporate governance and finan-
cial constraints measures to identify firms with
under- and overinvestment problems. Also, the
replication of this study in other industry settings
will corroborate the results of this study.
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